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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we study to what extent inconsistent feedback signals about performance affect firm 
adaptive behavior in terms of changes made to Research & Development (R&D) investments. We 
argue that inconsistency in performance feedback – based on discrepancies between two distinct 
performance signals – affects the degree to which such investments will be changed. Our aim is 
to show that accounting for inconsistent performance feedback is necessary as predictions for the 
direction of change in R&D investments based on the individual performance feedback signals 
are contradictory. Furthermore, we contribute by proposing a holistic consideration mechanism as 
an alternative to the selective attention mechanism previously applied to inconsistent performance 
feedback. Our findings show that the impact of inconsistency depends on the exact configuration 
of the underlying performance-feedback signal discrepancies. While consistently negative 
performance feedback signals would amplify their impact in stimulating increased R&D 
investments, inconsistent performance feedback signals created more nuanced effects. Having 
lower performance compared to an industry based peer group – despite doing well compared to 
the previous year – made firms decrease their R&D investments. For the opposite case of 
inconsistent performance feedback, we did not find an effect on change in R&D investments. 
These findings support to a degree our contention that explaining the effects of inconsistent 
performance feedback requires a holistic consideration theoretical mechanism instead of one 
involving selective attention. In sum, these findings suggest future research should take into 
account the differences between distinct instances of inconsistent performance feedback.  
 
Keywords: Performance feedback; Inconsistency; Behavioral Theory of the Firm; R&D 
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CONTRADICTORY YET COHERENT? INCONSISTENCY IN PERFORMANCE 
FEEDBACK AND R&D INVESTMENT CHANGE 
Organizational decision-makers commonly strive to enhance the survival of their firms 
and achieve desired levels of performance. In circumstances where this does not occur, they seek 
ways to get their firm back on track. One of the strategies at their disposal is to invest in Research 
& Development (R&D). R&D is a vital step on the path towards the successful launch of 
innovations (Crépon, Duguet, & Mairesse, 1998; Greve, 2003b), even though in the short run it is 
a cost and thus negatively impacts accounting performance indicators such as Return on Assets 
(Gavetti, Greve, Levinthal, & Ocasio, 2012). Innovations are impactful to firms in ensuring their 
continued existence and achieving above-average performance (for a recent meta-analysis see: 
Bowen, Rostami, & Steel, 2010). Given the benefits that can be gained from innovation, the 
normative implication for firm decision-makers would be that they should strive to bring about 
innovation. As being innovative is by no means a matter of direct managerial choice, the amount 
of resources invested to that effect (R&D) is the primary way for decision-makers to exert agency 
over the circumstances that foster innovation in their firms. Therefore, it becomes relevant to 
determine under what circumstances firms will in- or decrease their R&D expenditures. 
The main focus in studies seeking to explain firm-level R&D spending has been on 
structural and environmental antecedents. Levin, Cohen, and Mowery (1985) showed that R&D 
intensity was higher in younger industries with a strong science base where the government 
invested substantially in technology. Cohen and Klepper (1992) compared the distribution of 
R&D intensities within industries and found that they are quite similar from one industry to the 
next. They argued that this implies within industry variance in R&D intensity is driven by certain 
unobserved firm characteristics which are a function of features of the industry. Lee, Yoo and 
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Kwak (2011) demonstrated that among Korean firms, higher R&D activity was displayed by 
larger firms, firms receiving foreign direct investment and experiencing conducive external 
industry conditions. Cefis and Orsenigo (2001) found that high levels of firm innovative activity 
tended to remain stable over time while differences were found to be a matter of sector and firm 
size. In sum, factors driving rather stable levels of R&D among similar firms have been 
emphasized over the antecedents of within-firm variability in R&D intensity. Thus, the question 
of what stimulates an in- or decrease in R&D intensity has received less attention. 
In this paper we seek to explain under what circumstances changes in R&D intensity at 
the firm level occur. Over and above the variance in R&D investment levels explained by the 
aforementioned structural and field level factors, there are particular firm-specific factors causing 
heterogeneity between firms to manifest over time. We take a behavioral approach and 
conceptualize within-firm changes in R&D investment as a process of organizational adaptation. 
Specifically, we apply those behavioral theories linking feedback on organizational performance 
to organizational adaptation to explain changes in R&D investment levels. These behavioral 
theories offer explanatory factors that vary on the firm level – feedback on organizational 
performance – to explain part of the heterogeneity in R&D intensity between firms occurring 
over time. 
How performance feedback affects organizational adaptation is an important issue in 
studies on organization, management and strategy (Argote & Greve, 2007). Several contributions 
to the literature (Greve 2003a & 2010; Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2005; Lant, Milliken, & Batra, 
1992; Lant & Shapira, 2008; Milliken & Lant, 1991) have shown adaptation following 
performance feedback occurs in many organizational aspects, such as goal setting, expectation 
formation, evaluating alternative courses of action, as well as actual and impactful changes to 
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organizational structures, procedures and strategies. A few studies have already investigated how 
performance feedback affects R&D yielding an empirical baseline we build on and advance 
(Chen, 2008; Chen & Miller, 2007; Greve, 2003b; Salge, 2011; Vissa, Greve, & Chen, 2010). We 
discuss these studies in detail in our theory section and demonstrate that in sum they amount to a 
partial insight into R&D investment decision-making. We aim to advance our understanding of 
this key organizational decision. 
We extend this line of work on performance feedback by focusing on the, often times 
implicitly acknowledged, role of inconsistent performance feedback (Greve, 1998; Baum, 
Rowley, Shipilov, & Chuang, 2005). Inconsistent performance feedback means that the 
information available to the organization to evaluate its performance and determine whether or 
not to engage in adaptive behavior contains internal contradictions. These internal contradictions 
matter because they make it hard to come to an unambiguous conclusion whether or not the 
organization is achieving a level of performance that compares favorably to its goals. For 
instance, a firm might have increased its market share yet saw the value of its sales decline in a 
given year. On the one hand this firm might conclude that demand happened to be lower than 
usual in the current year, while its increase in market share shows its strategy is the right one. On 
the other hand, this firm might interpret the situation as one in which the market is becoming less 
interested in the current product range offered by the industry at large. In the latter situation, a 
firm would probably increase its R&D efforts seeking to develop products that better meet 
changed demands, while in the former situation a firm would not reevaluate its R&D efforts. 
Based on this illustration of the countervailing pressures exerted by inconsistent performance 
feedback we put forward the following research question: To what extent does inconsistent 
performance feedback affect change in R&D investment? 
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By advancing existing theory on the impact of inconsistent performance feedback we 
make our most important theoretical contribution. The literature so far has proposed two 
diametrically opposed decision-rules based on selective attention to one part of the performance 
feedback to capture the process by which decision-makers resolve the ambiguity introduced by 
inconsistent performance feedback (Baum et al., 2005; Greve, 1998). Departing from this 
selective attention theoretical mechanism, we propose an alternative decision rule, affordance-
urgency, based on a holistic consideration theoretical mechanism. We arrive at this after 
questioning the assumption behind the existing decision rules that all instances of inconsistent 
performance feedback will have the same effect. Inconsistent performance feedback is an 
ambiguous situation. This ambiguity might be a trigger for holistic consideration of the 
performance feedback. As a result of such more detailed evaluation of the performance feedback, 
decision-makers could in the end conclude that despite the inconsistency between the signals, in 
combination they yield a coherent interpretation. The alternative mechanism we introduce 
encompass exactly such holistic consideration. As such, we recognize that a broader range of 
responses to inconsistent performance feedback can occur than the literature currently accounts 
for. Hence, we primarily contribute to the literature on performance feedback and specifically to 
what impact inconsistency has on the performance feedback evaluation process. 
Furthermore, our study makes two additional contributions to the literature on R&D and 
organizational performance feedback. First, studies using structural models report that levels of 
R&D intensity (R&D spending relative to sales) are rather stable over time and that most of the 
variance can be attributed to differences across industries (Peters, 2009; Máñez-Castillejo, 
Rochina-Barrachina, Sanchis, & Sanchis, 2009). We contribute to this literature by exploring the 
sources of firm-level heterogeneity by building on behavioral theories of performance feedback. 
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Exploring such firm-level heterogeneity brings to the fore the circumstances that make firms 
change their level of R&D. Second, in behavioral theories on performance feedback, firms are 
described in rather generic terms, postulating that the predictions apply irrespective of industry, 
country or other contextual aspects. Nevertheless, as will become clear from our review of the 
extant literature in the next section, most empirical studies in this tradition on R&D intensity 
sampled firms from a single industry or limited range of industries. Therefore, the current 
literature provides only partial insight into how performance feedback impacts R&D investment 
decision making. Limited generalizability of the findings is a key reason for this. Our study 
includes a very broad sample of firms from a larger variety of industries and countries than thus 
far used in a single study or in the sum of studies linking performance feedback to R&D. We thus 
contribute empirically by exploring the external validity of theories on performance feedback. 
This puts the general applicability of the theory to the test and will provide a better picture of its 
generalizability. 
In the next section we discuss the theoretical arguments linking performance feedback to 
adaptive behavior. In addition, we present hypotheses on how (inconsistent) performance 
feedback results in firm-level change in R&D investment. Next, we describe the details and 
outcomes of our empirical investigation of these hypotheses. Last, we discuss the implications of 
our findings, note the limitations of our study and provide suggestions for further research on 
(inconsistent) performance feedback and R&D investment and innovation. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
In this section, we give an overview of the existing literature on performance feedback. In 
particular, we focus on those contributions that studied adaptive behavior in terms of changes in 
R&D investment. Based on this overview, we formulate baseline hypotheses that reflect the 
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commonly hypothesized and empirically corroborated relationships between performance 
feedback and adaptive behavior. Furthermore, we focus on the subsection of the literature that 
included inconsistency in performance feedback and discuss predictions for its effect on adaptive 
behavior derived from the fire-alarm and self-enhancing rules. Our primary theoretical 
contribution concerns questioning a shared assumption underlying the two decision rules and the 
selective attention mechanism they share – that all instances of inconsistent performance 
feedback will have the same consequence no matter the exact contradiction in the performance 
feedback – resulting in the final hypothesis. In this final hypothesis, we allow for different cases 
of inconsistent performance feedback to have opposite consequences. We derive these predictions 
from the holistic consideration (of all performance feedback signals) mechanism we introduce. 
Performance Feedback and Firm Level Change in R&D Investment 
Starting from the seminal work of Cyert and March (1963), A Behavioral Theory of the 
Firm, scholars have considered what role performance feedback plays in organizational behavior 
(Greve, 2003a; Lant & Montgomery, 1987). Performance feedback is an information-generating 
mechanism in which realized performance is evaluated against an aspiration level – the value of 
performance which a (coalition of) decision-maker(s) considers satisfying. The behavioral 
consequences of performance feedback do not derive from the firm maximizing performance, but 
rather from the identification of the boundary between success and failure – in effect, the lowest 
level of performance decision-makers find acceptable – and striving to attain at the very least a 
level of performance indicating success. Performance above the aspiration level is seen as a sign 
that the firm’s strategy, routines, and structure are in line with the demands of the firm’s 
environment implying no radical changes are necessary. Conversely, performance below the 
aspiration level indicates a mismatch between the firm’s strategy, routines, and structure and the 
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demands placed on it by the firm’s environment and will result in (radical) changes being made. 
As it developed over time, this line of work has shown that the relationship between performance 
feedback and adaptation is a matter of degree and not just a question of being below or above the 
aspiration level (Lant & Montgomery, 1987; Greve, 2003a). Most findings indicate that as 
performance increases relative to the aspiration level, the degree of changes made will decrease. 
This allows for some adaptation occurring in firms which did attain their aspiration level. 
While there is no universal agreement regarding this in the literature, many studies argue 
and show organizational decision-makers utilize multiple aspiration levels (Chen, 2008; Chen & 
Miller, 2007; Greve, 2003a; Salge, 2011). These aspiration levels are most commonly based on 
(1) aggregates of past performance and previous goal levels (historical aspiration level) as well 
as (2) performance of a selection of salient competitors (social aspiration level) or weighted 
combinations of these two performance cues (Greve, 2003a, 2003b; Vissa et al., 2010). While 
they are both used to evaluate current firm performance, historical and social aspiration levels do 
involve information sources that differ in relevant respects (Baum et al., 2005). The historical 
aspiration level is self-referential and in most cases involves a gradual updating as information 
about firm performance is integrated over time. In contrast to such internally derived information, 
the social aspiration level involves externally derived information through contemporaneous 
comparison to other firms’ performance levels. These other firms are selected based on relevant 
similarity criteria, which in empirical studies generally involves all firms in the same industry 
(pending data availability and sampling). 
While predictions and findings in the literature often indicate performance feedback based 
on these two aspiration levels have similar effects (Greve, 2003a), this is not universally the case. 
In studies on risk taking (Miller & Chen, 2004) and R&D intensity (Chen, 2008) by publicly 
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traded US manufacturing firms, Chen and colleague found that well-performing firms would be 
more likely to take risks the more favorably performance compared to prior firm performance yet 
be less likely to do so in case performance was compared to performance levels of similar firms. 
In a study on similar firms from Japan, Jung and Bansal (2009) found an inverted u-shape 
relationship between change in the degree of internationalization and performance relative to the 
historical aspiration level while for performance relative to the social aspiration level the 
relationship was monotonically positive. Next to these notable discrepancies, studies on 
performance feedback have often shown that sometimes performance relative to the historical 
aspiration level has an impact on adaptation while performance relative to the social aspiration 
level does not or vice versa (Chen & Miller, 2007; Greve, 2003c; Iyer & Miller, 2008). In 
addition, Chen (2008) stated that future research should account for both aspiration levels in order 
to differentiate their effects. Because we aim to advance the study of inconsistent performance 
feedback, minding these two different – and potentially contradictory – sources of information to 
evaluate current organizational performance is vital. 
Performance feedback is believed to lead to adaptation in a number of distinct 
organizational aspects, such as adjustment of the aspiration level, changes in the willingness to 
take risks, and problemistic search behavior (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve 2003a & 2010). In this 
paper we focus on the latter, which is called thus as it occurs in response to problems signaled by 
unsatisfactory performance (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 2003a). Problemistic search behavior 
can be seen as a process in which the firm reevaluates its strategy, routines, and structure and 
formulates one or more solutions believed to be better attuned to environmental demands. As 
such, these solutions present viable routes to performance improvement and hence aspiration 
level attainment. 
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Several types of search behavior have been discerned in previous studies. Firms can 
search for and consider alternatives in how they market their products, structure their operations, 
stimulate and reward their employees and many other areas. The most studied type of search 
behavior is technological search behavior (Chen, 2008; Chen & Miller, 2007; Greve, 2003b; Lant 
& Montgomery, 1987; Levinthal & March, 1981; Salge, 2011; Vissa et al., 2010). In practice and 
in most empirical studies, this concerns allocating resources to Research and Development 
(R&D) activities. Investments in R&D therefore are a potential key behavioral consequence of 
performance feedback. However, relative to the attention devoted to risky, strategic decisions in 
the performance feedback literature, only a few studies (Antonelli, 1989; Chen, 2008; Chen & 
Miller, 2007; Greve, 2003b; Salge, 2011; Vissa et al., 2010) have empirically studied this 
consequence of performance feedback. 
While one could argue that investing in R&D is also an indication of a change in the 
willingness to take risks next to being problemistic search behavior, there are a number of 
arguments that counter this assertion. First of all, whether increased R&D investment is indicative 
of an increase in organizational risk is debatable (Grenadier & Weiss, 1997; Greve, 2003b; 
Wiseman, McNamara, & Devers, 2001). On the one hand, R&D has uncertain returns and thus 
investing a large amount of the organization’s resources could put it at risk. Moreover, in the 
short term investing in R&D generally will have a negative impact on Return on Assets implying 
a performance decrease. On the other hand, increased investment in R&D may reduce 
organizational risk as it increases the number of future options for what innovations to launch 
given expectations about expected returns and risks associated with these options (Christensen, 
1997). Taken together these arguments define competing risks – the short-term performance risk 
versus the long-term risk of lagging behind in organizational renewal and losing market share – 
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which actually cancel each other out.  For this reason, arguments about an increase in the 
willingness to take risks are not applicable to R&D investment decisions. Furthermore, we focus 
on the adjustment of the level of R&D investment in response to performance feedback rather 
than the specific level of such investments. Recent work by Kacperczyk, Beckman and Moliterno 
(in press) illustrates that the question whether or not a particular strategic change following 
performance feedback is risky or not requires more nuanced theoretical discussion. While we 
argue that R&D investment changes cannot be equated with risk taking, Kacperczyk and 
colleagues (in press) demonstrate the same can apply to other common dependent variables in the 
organizational performance feedback literature. 
In the current study we conceptualize increasing R&D investment exclusively as 
problemistic search behavior. When performance feedback indicates the organization is not 
performing at desired levels, problemistic search for solutions is necessary and in effect allows an 
organization to reduce the risk of further performance shortfalls and eventual organizational 
failure (Vissa et al., 2010). A firm that increases R&D expenditures when facing a performance 
shortfall could actually be balancing out the abovementioned short and long term risks in such a 
way that the overall level of firm risk remains unchanged. 
Applying the general performance feedback prediction outlined above, we can state that 
firms which find their current performance to be unsatisfactory in the light of their aspiration 
level(s) will increase their allocation of resources to R&D. Reflecting this, the common 
prediction made in the literature regarding R&D is that firms will increase such investments the 
greater the negative discrepancy between current performance and aspiration level(s). 
Fragmented evidence for this prediction in relation to R&D intensity has been found in studies on 
the major players in the Japanese shipbuilding industry (Greve, 2003b),  publicly listed US 
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manufacturing firms (Chen, 2008; Chen & Miller, 2007), and publicly listed Indian companies in 
various industries (Vissa et al., 2010). Additional evidence comes from studies on R&D 
investment levels of Italian manufacturing firms (Antonelli, 1989), as well as the number of 
ongoing R&D projects relative to the number of employees in English non-specialist public-
sector hospital organizations (Salge, 2011).  
Most of these studies employed both a historical (based on past organizational 
performance) and a social aspiration level (based on peer group performance). In sum, they 
provide preliminary evidence that performance feedback theory applies in a broad range of 
industry and institutional settings. However, the cited studies each test the main prediction on a 
specific sample of organizations. Our study, by virtue of its multi-industry, multi-country sample 
of firms contributes to the generalizability of performance feedback theory by including all of the 
commercial sectors and countries studied thus far in a single empirical study. This results in the 
two baseline hypotheses as to how firms will change their investments in R&D given 
performance feedback
1
. In the remainder of this theory section we will argue that in case 
performance feedback is inconsistent, these baseline hypotheses do not apply. This implies that 
the baseline hypotheses do apply in case of consistent performance feedback meriting their 
inclusion in our model. The following are our baseline hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1A: The lower performance relative to the historical aspiration level 
becomes, the more firms will increase their R&D investments. 
Hypothesis 1B: The lower performance relative to the social aspiration level 
becomes, the more firms will increase their R&D investments. 
Inconsistency in Performance Feedback 
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In the studies on the effect of performance-aspiration discrepancies and R&D we have 
discussed, effects of different performance feedback signals are treated either as independent 
(Chen, 2008; Chen & Miller, 2007; Greve, 2003a) or as additive signals (Greve, 2003b; Vissa et 
al., 2010). In empirical analyses, they were sometimes treated as interchangeable (Chen, 2008; 
Chen & Miller, 2007) while in other studies only a single one is discussed and/or operationalized 
(Antonelli, 1989; Lant & Montgomery, 1987; Salge, 2011). This indicates an implicit assumption 
that decision-makers approach performance feedback evaluation as a fragmentary process in 
which each signal used to evaluate current performance is considered in isolation. We seek to 
question this assumption, and propose an alternative, less atomistic treatment of performance 
feedback. This alternative treatment is meant to advance our understanding of how inconsistent 
performance feedback affects problemistic search behavior – and hence change in R&D 
investments. A number of authors have specifically called for studies of how organizations deal 
with contradictory performance feedback (Greve, 2003a; Salge, 2011). We aim to answer that 
call and start by discussing the few studies that did include inconsistent performance feedback. 
Interestingly, none of these studies focused on problemistic search behavior and thus investments 
in R&D.  
The effects of inconsistency in performance feedback are discussed in the literature on 
multiple goals in performance feedback (Audia & Brion, 2007; Baum et al., 2005; Greve, 1998 & 
2008; Mezias, Chen, & Murphy, 2002). The presence of multiple goals implies that there are at 
least two aspiration levels to be considered. A direct consequence is that ambiguity is introduced 
in evaluating realized performance. Quite likely, not all performance-aspiration discrepancies will 
be in line with a single unequivocal evaluation of either success or failure. As a result, the 
subjective nature of performance evaluation becomes a relevant issue. Unfortunately, this part of 
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performance feedback has not received much conceptual attention (Jordan & Audia, 2012). 
Hence, it is challenging to predict the direction and extent of organizational adaptation following 
such a muddled performance evaluation. The practical relevance of multiple performance goals is 
illustrated in a study of letters to shareholders by the hand of CEOs in annual reports by Short and 
Palmer (2003). They found that these CEOs use multiple performance referents (aspiration levels 
in performance feedback theory terminology) from a variety of sources to evaluate their 
company’s performance (Short & Palmer, 2003). Applying this reasoning to the baseline model 
we discussed earlier, we observe that this model includes two aspiration levels – a historical and a 
social one – offering two sources of, potentially contradictory, information to evaluate 
performance.
2 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
In Table 1 we visualize the different possible configurations of consistent and inconsistent 
performance feedback and indicate what predictions can be made given the two baseline 
hypotheses (H1A and H1B). In case performance feedback is consistent (configurations 1 and 4 
in Table 1), performance feedback evaluation yields similar conclusions for both historical and 
social aspiration levels and thus predictions based on Hypotheses 1A and 1B are identical. For the 
two instances of inconsistent performance feedback (configurations 2 and 3 in Table 1), such 
predictions are direct opposites of each other as the two performance feedback evaluations yield 
contradictory conclusions. These two inconsistent performance feedback configurations will be 
the topic of discussion in the remainder of this theory section.  
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One could argue for a simple averaging out of the effects such that the larger 
performance-aspiration discrepancy determines whether or not investment in R&D will in- or 
decrease or an extreme signal heuristic in which the performance signal most distant to its 
respective aspiration level take precedence. However, it seems more likely that organizational 
decision-makers will be triggered by the inconsistency in the performance feedback. In the 
following, we will discuss the mechanisms from the performance feedback literature that have 
been or could be applied to inconsistent performance feedback. A first sort of response that might 
occur is inertia: decision-makers could wait for more performance feedback to arrive given that 
there is no clear-cut success-failure conclusion to be made. When facing ambiguous, inconsistent 
performance feedback, decision-makers might feel confused, and refrain from making changes to 
R&D investments (Milliken & Lant, 1991). However, from the few studies on inconsistent 
performance feedback the conclusion is that decision-makers do not let inconsistent performance 
feedback preclude them from engaging in adaptive behavior (Baum et al., 2005; Greve, 2008). 
The commonly used theoretical mechanism explaining responses to inconsistent feedback 
involves decision-rules. In accordance with the heuristics literature, decision rules are 
conceptualized as short-cuts in information processing decision-makers use to deal with complex, 
cognitively challenging situations (Greve, 2003a). Inconsistent performance feedback represents 
such a situation. In the following, we discuss the two diametrically opposed decision rules 
proposed in the literature – the fire-alarm and self-enhancing decision rule – and apply them to 
firm-level change in R&D investments. Both assume that decision-makers will be selective in 
what part of the performance feedback they pay attention to in order to reduce the level of 
complexity they are facing (Baum et al., 2005; Jordan & Audia, 2012). As mentioned before, we 
propose an alternative to this selective attention mechanism – holistic consideration of the 
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entirety of the performance feedback information – postulating a more elaborate fashion in which 
we believe decision-makers will handle the ambiguity introduced by inconsistent performance 
feedback. This alternative mechanism represents the key theoretical advancement we introduce to 
the performance feedback literature. Based on holistic consideration, we propose an alternative 
decision rule – the affordance-urgency rule. With the empirical findings emerging from our study 
in hand we can determine which of these mechanisms best explains firm-level change in R&D 
investments. 
The two studies which empirically accounted for inconsistency in performance feedback 
(Baum et al., 2005; Greve, 1998) made reference to two decision rules
3
, the fire-alarm and self-
enhancing rule. These decision rules describe a cognitive short-cut whereby decision-makers 
transform a situation of inconsistent performance feedback through selective attention to one 
more like a consistent performance feedback situation and act accordingly (i.e. follow the logic 
underlying the baseline model as included in Hypotheses 1A and 1B). They do so by focusing on 
the most relevant performance-aspiration discrepancy and proceeding as if the other one need not 
be factored into their decision or does not exist at all – i.e. selective attention to a subset of the 
performance feedback signals (Audia & Brion, 2007; Baum et al., 2005; Greve, 1998, 2008; 
Jordan & Audia, 2012; Mezias et al., 2002). Thus, given similar performance feedback (either 
configuration 2 or 3 in Table 1), the effects of performance feedback on subsequent R&D levels 
can be strikingly different depending on the decision rule employed. Therefore, inconsistent 
performance feedback is a good candidate to explain firm-level heterogeneity in R&D 
investments over time. 
First, decision-makers could operate according to a fire-alarm rule (Baum et al., 2005; 
Greve, 1998). This implies their attention is drawn most strongly to the performance-aspiration 
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discrepancy that indicates a problem, in effect the one that is negative. The positive performance-
aspiration discrepancy is deemed of no or far lesser relevance. As such, the fire-alarm rule is a 
rather straightforward extension of the baseline model to inconsistent performance feedback since 
decision-makers still operate as problem-solvers (Jordan & Audia, 2012) motivated by the desire 
to reduce any and all negative discrepancies between current versus desired outcomes (Audia & 
Brion, 2007). Any performance signal indicating a problem triggers a reevaluation of the firm’s 
strategy, routines and structure – even if it occurs simultaneously with a positive performance 
signal (Baum et al., 2005). This fits with the sequential attention to goals argument of Cyert and 
March (1963) stating that an aspiration-performance discrepancy only becomes and remains 
relevant in so far that it indicates a problem – i.e. when it is negative (Greve, 2003a, 2008) As 
such, decision-makers remain temporarily consistent in their standards of evaluation (Jordan & 
Audia, 2012) and continue striving to correct any negative performance-aspiration discrepancy 
(Baum et al., 2005). Based on the fire-alarm rule, one would thus predict an increase in R&D 
investments the greater the negative performance-aspiration discrepancy.  
Second, decision-makers might follow a self-enhancing rule. If they do, they focus on the 
positive performance-aspiration discrepancy and neglect the negative one. This represents a 
departure from the logic underlying the baseline model, in that decision-makers employing this 
decision-rule no longer function as problem-solvers but rather seek to enhance their own self-
image (Jordan & Audia, 2012). People in general are characterized to a smaller or larger degree 
by a need to see themselves in a positive light (Audia & Brion, 2007). Firm decision-makers 
generally strive to be evaluated as competent and successful. As architects of the firm’s strategy, 
routines and structure, evaluation of the firm’s performance implies evaluation of their own 
personal competence and success. Furthermore, especially negative performance feedback can 
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result in decision-makers to feel threatened and insecure about their careers. The more they feel 
they have a personal stake in the firm’s decisions, the more self-enhancement will affect 
evaluation of the firm’s performance (Jordan & Audia, 2012). Additionally, human beings more 
easily process positive evaluations than negative ones and attribute failure to external 
circumstances rather than their own behavior.  
Reflecting on these mostly psychological arguments, self-enhancement does seem likely 
when inconsistent performance feedback occurs. The negative performance-aspiration 
discrepancy can easily be the source of threat, while the more easily processed positive one 
allows decision-makers to portray their actions in a positive light. While this line of reasoning 
illustrates that self-enhancement can occur in case performance feedback is inconsistent, that does 
not necessarily mean it will. Jordan and Audia (2012) stated that whether or not self-enhancement 
tendencies of individual decision-makers actually manifest themselves in firm-level decisions is a 
function of the latitude to portray performance in a positive light is present. The more complex 
the decision task, which clearly applies to inconsistent performance feedback, the greater this 
latitude. Moreover, the ambiguous nature of inconsistent performance feedback makes it a 
situation in which decision-makers will be prone to self-enhancement (Audia & Brion, 2007)   
Jordan and Audia (2012) highlighted three strategies of dealing with performance 
feedback that reflect self-enhancement. The most applicable one to inconsistent performance 
feedback is the possibility to retroactively revise the priority of performance goals. Whereas 
decision-makers operating as problem-solvers (as the fire-alarm rule espouses) would remain 
temporarily consistent in how they evaluate performance feedback, those operating as self-
enhancers will take ambiguity in performance signals as an opportunity to redefine standards of 
evaluation. A second applicable one is that in this sort of situation they can invoke counterfactual 
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outcomes as a standard of comparison instead of the actual ones (Jordan & Audia, 2012). In 
effect, this is a glass half full, glass half empty situation in which the decision-makers might 
claim that had they not followed the firm’s strategy both performance-aspiration discrepancies 
would be negative instead of just the one. Inconsistent performance feedback is then actually 
redefined as an indication of success rather than one equally indicative of success and failure. The 
use of these sorts of strategies makes decision-makers emphasize the positive performance-
aspiration discrepancy over the negative one. Therefore, the self-enhancing rule predicts a 
decrease in search behavior the greater the positive performance-aspiration discrepancy. 
Empirical evidence on which of the decision rule applies to inconsistency between 
performance relative to a historical and social aspiration level is scarce, though the study by 
Baum and co-authors (2005) on Canadian investment banks partnering choices supports the fire-
alarm rule. However, Greve’s study (1998) on format choices by US radio broadcasters did not 
find a significant effect of inconsistency at all. Next to these results not being mutually 
supporting, they apply to different dependent variables than we study – though they entail some 
sort of strategic change similar to the one we consider. Which of the two decision rules best 
explains changes in R&D investments following inconsistent performance feedback is therefore 
still an empirically relevant question. Thus, we propose the following two competing hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2A (fire-alarm rule): If performance feedback is inconsistent 
(configuration 2 and 3 in Table 1), the lower the negative performance-
aspiration discrepancy the more firms will increase their R&D investments. 
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Hypothesis 2B (self-enhancing rule): If performance feedback is inconsistent 
(configuration 2 and 3 in Table 1), the higher the positive performance-
aspiration the more firms will decrease their R&D investments. 
 While the decision-rules just discussed involve decision-makers neglecting half of the 
performance feedback information available, one could imagine that they try and make sense of 
what the two apparently contradictory signals imply when considered in combination. With 
regards to problemistic search, an oft repeated characterization of that process includes the 
assumption that search starts in the proximity of the problem area identified. Furthermore, what 
sort of solutions receive attention is informed by the problem diagnosis (Cyert & March, 1963; 
Greve, 2003a; Vissa et al., 2010). Decision-makers bring to bear their previous experiences, 
insights into their industry and other knowledge to the table (Gavetti et al., 2012). These factors 
may bias or enhance their interpretation of performance feedback and conclusion as to whether it 
indicates a problem and what sort of problem that may be. As contemporary organizations are 
often asked to satisfy multiple, in all likelihood competing goals (Short & Palmer, 2003; Greve, 
2003a), they probably develop some kind of higher-order decision rule or meta-cognitive strategy 
to make sense of contradictory information. With such tools in place, decision-makers acquire 
cognitive templates used to resolve the ambiguity created by contradictory performance feedback 
signals. This particular line of reasoning has not been thoroughly considered in the performance 
feedback literature to our knowledge. 
We explore this alternative line of reasoning and propose how holistic consideration 
would affect change in R&D investments following inconsistent performance feedback. Strategic 
choice is not only driven by motivation but also by whether a decision-maker believes there are 
proper opportunities to do so and the organization has the capabilities to utilize them (Chen, Su & 
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Tsai, 2007). Thus, while the performance feedback literature generally discusses what sort of 
performance feedback signals generate the motivation to change (Greve, 1998, 2003a), it might 
be useful to also consider managerial interpretations of performance feedback in terms of the 
presence of opportunities and capabilities to increase future organizational performance. 
The classical entrepreneurial ‘logic’ (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2011) could 
serve as a potential cognitive template that does provide straightforward guidelines to draw 
sensible conclusions from inconsistent performance feedback. This consideration is especially 
applicable to one of the inconsistent performance feedback situation. When the historical 
performance discrepancy is positive and the social one negative (configuration 3 in Table 1), 
decision-makers face a situation in which the fact that their competitors on average achieve 
higher performance demonstrates that there are opportunities to improve their own performance. 
Increasing R&D investments is a suitable strategy for firms intending to appropriate such 
opportunities (Antonelli, 1989). Greve (1998) indicates that next to providing a source of 
information to evaluate firm performance, other firms may also signal market opportunities worth 
exploring. We build on this by asserting that the former – in case competing firms are performing 
better than the focal firm – can inform the firm that the latter – market opportunities worth 
pursuing – exist. Moreover, these firms are experiencing a positive trend in performance, and 
therefore they can come to the conclusion that they also have the means and thus the capability to 
act upon those opportunities. This may instill confidence and the ambition to adjust goals upward 
(Baum et al., 2005). The actual presence of resources over and above needed to ensure the 
organization can continue operating – organizational slack – has consistently been shown to 
increase the level of R&D investments (Chen, 2008; Chen & Miller, 2007; Greve, 2003b; Vissa 
et al., 2010).  
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Combining these elements of urgency to act and being able to afford taking action, an 
affordance-urgency decision rule implies increasing R&D investment in this particular 
configuration of inconsistent performance feedback. The study of Salge (2011) on English non-
specialist public sector hospitals offers some insight into whether the logic underlying this 
decision-rule holds. He found a positive interaction effect between performance-aspiration 
discrepancy (based on a social aspiration level) and organizational slack, i.e. hospitals that lagged 
behind their competitors while simultaneously possessing high levels of slack resources would 
have more R&D projects relative to the number of employees than hospitals with low levels of 
slack. In contrast when firms are performing at a higher level than the average competitor 
(configuration 2 in Table 1), the opposite is the case. First, there is no sense of urgency to be felt, 
but rather a potential argument for being content with the status quo as the firm evidently has 
seized all market opportunities worth pursuing as can be concluded from being ahead of the 
competition. Combined with the fact that experiencing a negative trend in performance of their 
organization reduces the availability of resources to take strategic action, in this case the 
affordance-urgency decision rule would predict a decrease in R&D investments. Based on these 
arguments, we propose the final hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3 (affordance-urgency rule): In case performance feedback is 
inconsistent, the further above the historical aspiration level and the further 
below the social aspiration level performance is, the more firms will increase 
their R&D investments. 
METHODS 
We use data from “The 2010 EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard” (European 
Commission, 2010) to test our hypotheses. This scorecard, composed by two research 
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organizations of the European Union (the Joint Research Centre and the Research Directorates-
General of the European Commission), ranked European Union (EU) firms in terms of their 
investment in R&D and compared them to non-EU firms also ranked in terms of their R&D 
expenditures. In total, data on 1000 EU and 1000 non-EU firms
4
 were available. Data mainly 
concerned the 2009 fiscal year on which the ranking was based, but also included measures 
pertaining to 2008, 2007 and 2006. For details on the compilation procedure, we refer to Annex 3 
of the report (European Commission, 2010).  
Our theoretical interest concerns the effect of performance feedback on firm-level change 
in R&D investments. Below we will explain in detail how we operationalized these constructs 
respectively in terms of sales growth and R&D intensity change. As the firms were selected for 
the scorecard based on the monetary value of their 2009 R&D expenditures, we checked the 
distribution of values for the 2009 and 2008 R&D intensity measures. We found that a few rather 
extreme outliers were present in the dataset. A scatter plot of these two variables showed that 
firms which had a value of 300% or higher for either of these measures deviated markedly from 
the general pattern of strong positive correlation. We excluded these firms as it is likely that 
unique firm-specific events rather than performance feedback led to such extreme year-to-year 
deviations in R&D intensity. In a second step, we consulted annual reports, company websites 
and/or press releases to determine what occurred for firms which showed absolute changes of 
200% or higher of sales in 2007 and/or 2008. Some of these firms were excluded, with reasons 
for doing being structural changes like mergers and acquisitions and unique events which led to a 
discontinuity in sales. Beyond the already named reasons for exclusion based on extreme values 
in R&D intensity or sales level changes, another motivation for taking these steps is that in all 
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likelihood the excluded firms were not seen as relevant to compare performance with by the other 
firms in our sample. These steps reduced our sample to 1,922 firms.  
Measures 
As dependent variable – R&D intensity change – we used the difference between the 
R&D Intensity (R&D investments/Net sales) values provided for the fiscal years 2009 and 2008. 
Thus, our dependent variable represents the extent to which R&D investments (relative to firm 
size) were in- or decreased. 
We constructed two performance-aspiration discrepancy measures to serve as independent 
variables. Following earlier studies (Baum et al., 2005; Greve, 1998), we used a measure of the 
historical and the social aspiration level. Both performance feedback measures were based on net 
sales growth. Historical performance discrepancy was calculated by subtracting the historical 
aspiration level (% sales growth from 2006 to 2007) from the firm’s performance (% sales growth 
from 2007 to 2008).  
Social performance discrepancy was calculated by subtracting the social aspiration level 
(average % sales growth from 2007 to 2008 for all other firms in the industry the firm was active 
in) from the firm’s performance (% sales growth from 2007 to 2008). We used all available other 
firms in the industry to calculate the social aspiration level (out of the 1,922 left after the above 
exclusions were made), even if some of these firms used for comparison needed to be excluded 
from the actual analyses later on due to missing data. This procedure is most commonly used in 
the empirical literature to capture average performance of the peer reference group (Baum et al., 
2005; Greve, 1998). By using this procedure we select firms which also devote substantial 
amounts of funds to R&D and are in most cases also among the larger firms in their industry. 
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Therefore, they should be rather visible to other firms in the industry besides facing rather similar 
competitive environments. For 39 firms no data was available to calculate the social aspiration 
level while the historical aspiration level could not be calculated for a further 49 firms for the 
same reason. This reduced our sample to 1,834 firms. 
As noted in the introduction, previous work has focused on structural explanation for 
differences in levels of R&D. As we aim to show that (in)consistent performance feedback 
matters on top of such more stable, structural antecedents, we need to account for such structural 
aspects. First of all, we controlled for Industry. Given that we also used this industry variable to 
determine which firms were relevant to construct the social aspiration level, we needed to make 
sure the number of firms per sector was not too small. The firms in the database were classified 
using the ICB Industry Classification System, which like NACE or SIC has four levels of 
increased specificity (1, 2, 3 or 4 digit sector classification). Firms were generally classified at the 
3-digit level, yielding 45 unique sectors. Some of these included less than 10 firms, so we 
condensed the classification prior to calculating social aspiration levels to 25 sectors as follows. 
In case a sector included at least 100 firms, we did not aggregate. In case the sector included less 
than 100 firms we aggregated up to the 2 digit-level until at least 50 firms were represented in a 
sector or no meaningful aggregation was possible (for instance, for the Media and Travel & 
Leisure industries). The bank, insurance and other financial sectors were merged up to the 1 digit 
level, as these were sparsely populated even at the 2 digit level. We added a number of industry 
dummies to our analyses equal to the number of sectors minus 1. We used the retail industry as 
the excluded category and hence the comparison industry. 
As our data included firms from all over the world, we also controlled for where the firms 
was headquartered to accommodate cross-region macro-economical, legal and institutional 
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differences.
5
 This data was provided at the country level, yielding 46 unique countries of which 
again quite a number were sparsely represented. We condensed these into 13 regions based on a 
classification provided by the Statistics Division of the United Nations (2011). We deviated in 
two instances to obtain sufficient aggregation. We categorized a firm headquartered in the 
Cayman Islands as North America instead of the Caribbean, and merged a firm headquartered in 
South Africa with eight located in Brazil into a single category. While the latter category includes 
firms from two different continents, both are headquarters in countries that are often grouped 
together as emerging economies undergoing rapid economic development (BRIC countries) and 
have similar legal and institutional features. Furthermore, as Taiwan is not an UN member it is 
not included in the classification scheme we used. We chose to include Taiwan in the same 
category as China, Hong Kong, Japan and South Korea (Eastern Asia). We added a number of 
Region dummies to our analyses equal to the number of regions minus 1. We used North America 
as the excluded category and hence the comparison region. 
As a last structural feature, we controlled for organizational size by the including the 
number of employees in 2009 (Number of employees 2009). We log-transformed this variable 
because the distribution of the number of employees of the firms represented in our sample was 
right-skewed. As a result of 84 cases with missing data on one of the control variables, our final 
sample included 1,750 firms.  
Model and analyses 
As is common practice in performance feedback studies, we employed splined regression 
to be able to detect changes in sensitivity to performance feedback around the aspiration levels 
(Greve, 2003a). Thus, we will include two coefficients for both performance-aspiration 
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discrepancy variables. The first takes the value of the non-splined variable if this is smaller than 
0, and 0 otherwise. The second takes the value of the non-splined variable if this is greater than 0, 
and 0 otherwise. Effectively, for each of the performance-aspiration discrepancy variables we 
model the negative and positive range of values using separate variables. The first describes the 
effect on the dependent variable for an increase in performance towards the as yet not attained 
aspiration level. The second does the same, but then for an increase in performance beyond the 
already attained aspiration level. Prior to performing the spline procedure, we divided both 
performance-aspiration discrepancy measures by 100 in order to obtain interpretable regression 
coefficients.  
As we aim to investigate the effect of inconsistent performance feedback as opposed to 
consistent performance feedback, we also calculated the interactions between the four 
performance variables (Baum et al., 2005). Three of these will take a value of 0 as two of the 
underlying values that are multiplied to yield the performance feedback interaction variables are 
zero as a result of the splined regression approach.  
To test our hypotheses we employ OLS regression. To account for heteroskedasticity, 
standard errors were clustered by industry in these models. All statistical tests were two-tailed.  
RESULTS 
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables included in our 
analyses, excluding industry and region dummies. The pattern of correlation between our 
variables is in line with what would be expected based on our baseline hypotheses (H1A & H1B). 
Both performance discrepancy measures had a significantly negative correlation with the 
dependent variable R&D intensity change. Moreover, the two performance-aspiration variables 
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were correlated, but not extremely so indicating they do communicate distinct information 
regarding organizational success and failure to the decision-maker. Last, organizational size was 
not strongly correlated with change in R&D intensity. It did however have a weak, positive 
correlation to both performance-aspiration comparisons indicating that larger firms were slightly 
more likely to also be better performing firms. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
Table 3 presents the results of the OLS regression analyses for R&D intensity change. To 
prevent unnecessary cluttering, we do not report individual coefficients for the industry and 
region dummies.
6
 Since we controlled for industry and geographical region, the results we present 
apply across this broad range of firms. Model 1 includes only the control variables. Model 2 adds 
the splined performance-aspiration discrepancy coefficients. Model 3 adds the performance-
aspiration discrepancy interaction coefficients. In each model, an increasing amount of the 
variance in R&D intensity change is explained. We observe that firm size, as indicated by the 
number of employees in 2009 (log-transformed), did not impact R&D intensity change 
corroborating the picture emerging from the correlations in Table 1. Model 2 and 3 are of 
substantive interest to us. In Model 2 all performance discrepancy coefficients are in the 
expected, negative, direction except for the positive social performance discrepancy coefficient. 
However, none of these coefficients reaches significance. As both historical performance-
aspiration discrepancy coefficient pointed in the same direction, we further explore this result by 
estimating the model without the splined coefficients. In Table 4 the result of this additional 
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model (Model 4) are presented. In Model 4, the coefficient for historical aspiration-performance 
discrepancy is negative and significant indicating that for each 100% annual sales growth in 2009 
would decline relative to 2008, R&D intensity would increase by 7.38 percentage points. This 
result fits Hypothesis 1A as it indicates that the less favorably performance compares against 
previous firm performance, the more firms will increase their R&D intensity. 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 and 4 & Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------------------------------- 
To aid interpretation of Model 3 which includes interaction coefficients, the effect of 
performance feedback on R&D intensity change is graphically displayed in Figure 1. Firm size 
(log of the number of employees in 2009) was held constant at its sample mean. Recall that the 
retail sector and North America were the reference categories for industry respectively region. In 
Model 3, the interaction coefficient for indicating a negative historical and negative social 
performance discrepancy (configuration 1 in Table 1) proved to be significant. Figure 1 (the left 
backward portion in particular) shows that the more negative both of these performance-
aspiration discrepancies would become (configuration 1 in Table 1), the more R&D intensity 
would be increased, by up to 11 percentage points. This significant finding lends support to 
Hypotheses 1A and 1B which are consistent with such an effect. Furthermore, the negative 
coefficient for consistently positive performance feedback (configuration 4 in Table 1) also fits 
with these two baseline hypotheses but is not significant. Combined with the results in Models 2 
and 4, we can conclude that we confirm the baseline model to a substantial degree. More 
relevantly, in particular based on the results of Model 3 as shown in Figure 1 we can conclude 
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that the baseline model applies especially to situations in which performance feedback is 
consistent. This indicates the merit of accounting for the multiplicative effects of the two 
performance-aspiration discrepancies rather than considering them in isolation which has been 
common in the performance feedback literature. As these results demonstrate, that would 
obfuscate important and noteworthy effects of performance feedback. 
With regards to the effect of inconsistent performance feedback, the interaction coefficient 
for indicating a positive historical and negative social performance (configuration 3 in Table 1) 
discrepancy was also significant. As is visible in Figure 1, the greater the extent to which the two 
performance-aspiration comparisons are inconsistent in this direction (configuration 3 in Table 1) 
the more firms would decrease their level of R&D intensity, by up to 70 percentage points . In the 
contrasting inconsistent performance feedback situation (configuration 2 in Table 1), we did not 
find a significant effect on change in R&D intensity though based on Figure 1 the direction of the 
effect seems to be the opposite of the other inconsistent performance feedback situation. 
This pattern of results does not fully fit any of the hypotheses we formulated on the 
impact of inconsistent performance feedback. Nevertheless, the one significant results does fit 
with the self-enhancing decision-rule (Hypothesis 2B) yet contradicts the fire-alarm and 
affordance-urgency rules (Hypothesis 2A and 3) that both predict an increase in R&D intensity in 
this situation (configuration 3 in Table 1). However, full confirmation of the self-enhancing 
decision rule would require a similar finding for the other situation of inconsistent performance 
feedback (configuration 2 in Table 1) which though not significant points in the opposite 
direction. In the following section we delve deeper into the theoretical implications of these 
findings and offer some suggestions for further study of inconsistent performance feedback. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper asked how (in)consistent performance feedback affects to what extent firms 
change their level of R&D investments. In particular, we looked at (in)consistency in 
performance-aspiration discrepancies based on a historical and social aspiration level which were 
the most commonly used performance feedback signals in the literature (Baum et al., 2005; 
Greve, 1998, 2003a). As inconsistent performance feedback is more ambiguous than consistent 
performance feedback, deriving a clear conclusion as to whether the firm’s prior strategies, 
routines, and structures are appropriate is harder to do. Studying the impact of (in)consistent 
performance feedback on changes in R&D investments is important since this serves to provide 
the firm with opportunities for innovation which in turn increase its chances of surviving and 
thriving (Bowen et al., 2010; Crépon et al., 1998; Greve, 2003b). While innovation itself is not 
something under the direct control of the firm’s decision-makers, the amount of resources spend 
on R&D is and thereby an important strategy to bring about innovation to remedy performance 
shortfalls. 
Our modeling approach was in line with a baseline model derived from received theory 
(Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 2003a & 2010) and previous empirical work linking performance 
feedback to R&D investment (Chen, 2008; Chen & Miller, 2007; Greve, 2003b; Salge, 2011; 
Vissa et al., 2010). The baseline model indicates that the less favorably performance compares 
against a historical (Hypothesis 1A) or social (Hypothesis 1B) aspiration level, the higher the 
level of adaptive behavior and thus the increase in R&D investments. With this baseline model in 
place, we were able to explore the extension to models accounting for inconsistency in 
performance feedback. As displayed in Table 1, the baseline model results in contradictory 
Inconsistency in Performance Feedback and R&D Investment Change 33 
 
predictions regarding the direction in which firms will change their R&D investments in case 
performance feedback is inconsistent (configuration 2 and 3 in Table 1).  
Our results are to a large extent in accordance with the baseline model. In line with our 
expectations, the predictions derived from this model as stated in Hypothesis 1A and 1B applied 
most clearly to the two instances of consistent performance feedback (configurations 1 and 4 in 
Table 1). Moreover, it seems there is a mutually reinforcing negative effect of performance 
feedback derived from the historical and social aspiration levels in the case of consistently 
negative performance feedback (configuration 1 in Table 1). This fits similar findings in earlier 
studies (Greve, 2008; Labianca, Fairbank, Andrevski, & Parzen, 2009) involving multiple types 
of performance indicators rather than distinct sources of performance feedback signals as we 
used. In introducing the need to go beyond considering performance feedback signals in isolation, 
we stressed that they might have more than additive or independent effects. Our results clearly 
show these effects are multiplicative and thus should be considered jointly. With the baseline 
predictions not applicable to cases of contradictory performance feedback (configuration 2 and 3 
in Table 1), expanding this baseline model with specific mechanisms and predictions to 
accommodate the impact of inconsistency in performance feedback proved necessary. 
Our most important theoretical contribution regards the introduction of the holistic 
consideration theoretical mechanism as an alternative to the selective attention mechanism 
previously applied to explain the impact of inconsistent performance feedback on adaptive 
behavior. Based on the latter, scholars (Baum et al., 2005; Greve, 1998; Jordan & Audia, 2012) 
have proposed two diametrically opposed decision-rules involving attention to a subset of the 
performance feedback signals to capture the process by which decision-makers resolve the 
ambiguity introduced by inconsistent performance feedback (Baum et al., 2005; Greve, 1998; 
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Jordan & Audia, 2012). On the one hand, the fire-alarm decision rule involves attention being 
directed to any negative performance feedback signal. On the other hand, a self-enhancing 
decision rule involves attention being directed to any positive performance feedback signal. 
While the significant result for one of instances of inconsistent performance feedback 
(configuration 3 in Table 1) was in line with the self-enhancing decision rule (Hypothesis 2B), 
the other one though insignificant pointed in a direction in line with the fire-alarm decision rule 
(Hypothesis 2A). 
In our theoretical discussion of inconsistent performance feedback, we questioned the 
assumption that all instances of inconsistent performance feedback (configuration 2 and 3 in 
Table 1) will have the same effect on adaptive behavior underlying the selective attention 
mechanism. The results regarding inconsistent performance feedback indicate we were correct in 
doing so. As an alternative to the selective attention theoretical mechanism, we proposed a 
holistic consideration theoretical mechanism. Inconsistent performance feedback is an ambiguous 
situation and might thus be a trigger for holistic consideration of the performance feedback. As a 
result of such more detailed evaluation of the performance feedback, decision-makers could in 
the end conclude that despite the inconsistency between the signals, in combination they yield a 
coherent interpretation. By introducing this alternative mechanism we recognized that a broader 
range of responses to inconsistent performance feedback can occur than the literature currently 
accounted for. Hence, we primarily contribute to the literature on performance feedback and 
specifically to what impact inconsistency has on the performance feedback evaluation process.  
The results do not corroborate the affordance-urgency decision rule (Hypothesis 3) we 
proposed involving holistic consideration of the performance feedback with regards to the 
opportunities and capabilities to increase R&D investments next to the common motivational 
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effects (Chen et al., 2007; Greve, 1998, 2003a). Nevertheless, the fact that the impact on change 
in R&D intensity of the two inconsistent performance feedback instances is not uniformly 
positive or negative to us demonstrates that the idea of holistic consideration holds merit. 
Evidently, decision-makers gave different interpretation to these instances of performance 
feedback resulting in distinct effects on change in R&D intensity. Further theorizing and 
empirical study is required to fully understand the nature and impact of inconsistent performance 
feedback. A possible direction this could be taken in future research involves exploring to what 
extent prior knowledge, understanding of the industry circumstances, and past experience of the 
firm and its decision-makers result in a particular holistic interpretation of inconsistent 
performance feedback (Gavetti et al., 2012). Given differences in these firm and decision-maker 
characteristics, the non-finding for one of the instances of inconsistent performance feedback 
(configuration 2 in Table 1) in the current study could very well be explained. As problemistic 
search generally takes place not only in areas near the identified problem but also is more likely 
in more familiar areas (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 2003a; Vissa et al., 2010), accounting for 
such factors of between-firm heterogeneity seems a fruitful pursuit. 
Our findings indicate that our attention to inconsistency in performance feedback is a 
valuable addition to the literature on organizational learning from performance feedback (Greve 
2003a & 2010; Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2005; Lant et al., 1992; Lant & Shapira, 2008; Milliken 
& Lant, 1991). We questioned the assumption that effects of distinct performance feedback 
signals, a key source of information in strategic decision-making, would be independent or 
simply additive. Our study shows reality is more complex and thereby underlines the need for 
understanding the qualities of multi-faceted performance feedback. Moreover, we did so in 
relation to R&D investment, the most studied sort of search behavior (Chen, 2008; Chen & 
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Miller, 2007; Greve 2003b; Salge, 2011; Vissa et al., 2010). As search behavior is the pathway to 
solutions firms can draw upon to improve performance, finding that firms will increase their 
R&D intensity only if both performance feedback signals are negative (see Figure 1 and Model 3 
in Table 3) implies that engaging in search behavior is by no means a trivial step.  
Future research could consider the impact of inconsistent performance feedback on other 
managerial and organizational behaviors previous research has shown to be affected by 
performance feedback. For instance, the willingness to take risks could be considered. This, next 
to search behavior, is an important precursor to important strategic decisions such as strategic 
change and innovation adoption (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 2003a; Greve, 2010). It would be 
interesting to determine if the willingness to take risk following inconsistent performance 
feedback is greatly reduced (a self-enhancing response), or is driven by holistic consideration 
involving evaluation of the opportunities and capabilities to successfully take risks. In our 
theoretical discussion we highlighted recent discussion on whether a strategic change can 
invariably be described as a risky one (Kacperczyk et al., in press). Our arguments demonstrate 
that R&D investment should be conceptualized as problemistic search only. Future research 
should also be nuanced in terms of whether the dependent variable under study is indicative of 
search and/or a risk. Even so, as innovation is a generally risky pursuit (March, 1991; Massini, 
Lewin & Greve, 2005) inconsistent performance feedback might not only dampen levels of firm 
innovation as a consequence of reducing R&D intensity but also by making it less likely 
decision-makers accept the risk inherent in the options for innovation available to them. 
Following up on studies on inconsistent performance feedback and risk taking, the effect on 
eventual strategic decision-making, for instance pertaining to launching innovations, could be 
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considered while accounting for its effects on search behavior (R&D) and willingness to take 
risks. 
Our study is not without its limitations. For instance, the firms in our sample were among 
those which devote substantial resources to R&D since they were selected to be included in the 
2010 EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard based on their high levels of R&D spending. 
This opens up the question whether our results apply to firms for which R&D is of less strategic 
importance. Hence, replication using a broader sample of firms combined with a panel data set-up 
would serve to confirm and further expand upon the results of our study pertaining to inconsistent 
performance feedback. Our study was cross-sectional – even though data pertaining to 
performance feedback and was lagged with respect to R&D intensity and change thereof – and 
hence we were unable to explore if effects of inconsistency might change over time. For instance, 
do firms that repeatedly face inconsistent performance feedback develop routines that allow them 
to single out those components of performance feedback in need of attention and act accordingly? 
Moreover, decision-makers do use more than a single performance metric to evaluate their 
performance (Short & Palmer, 2003) and a variety of different metrics has been used in the 
empirical literature (Greve, 2003a & 2010). We used sales growth in our study, but cannot 
confirm that this would be the most important one with respect to determining R&D investment. 
Nevertheless, we did show that sales growth captures firm performance sufficiently to predict 
subsequent changes in R&D investments.  
In conclusion, we show that inconsistency in performance feedback matters to search 
behavior as captured by changes made to R&D investments. Nevertheless, more theoretical and 
empirical effort is needed to provide and corroborate an exhaustive explanation for these 
phenomena.
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FOOTNOTES 
1 
A number of the studies just mentioned extend the linear baseline model by postulating that the 
strength of the relationship between performance-aspiration discrepancy and the magnitude of 
R&D intensity differ for values below and above the aspiration level (Chen, 2008; Chen & 
Miller, 2007; Greve, 2003b; Vissa et al., 2010). As a result of risk tolerance and inertial 
pressures, a kinked-curve relationship emerges where R&D intensity would be more sensitive to 
performance feedback above than below the aspiration level. Nevertheless, empirical studies 
testing this model (Chen, 2008; Chen & Miller, 2007; Greve, 2003b; Vissa et al., 2010) have 
failed to confirm it with regards to R&D intensity and therefore we do not put forward any 
hypotheses derived from the kinked curve model. 
2
 In this paper, we look at inconsistency between a historical and social aspiration level based on 
a single performance measure. Some of the studies (Audia & Brion, 2007; Greve, 2008) on 
multiple goals considered aspiration levels based on two distinct performance criteria. Over and 
above the discussion on whether to devote greater attention to negative or positive performance-
aspiration discrepancies, in such cases the ranking of different goal dimensions in terms of their 
importance plays a role. In order to isolate the effect of inconsistency from that of goal hierarchy, 
we consider the case in which both aspiration levels pertain to the same goal criterion. 
3 
Audia & Brion (2007) also referred to these rules in relation to inconsistency between 
performance-discrepancies on two different goal dimensions. Mezias et al., (2002) used these 
rules as well in their study on aspiration updating though did not consider them in relation to 
inconsistency between performance-aspiration discrepancies. 
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4 
Non-EU refers to the rest of the world, including other European countries that are not members 
of the EU (for instance Switzerland, Norway, etc). 
5
 In addition to these controls for region, we ran the model reported in this paper with an indicator 
variable distinguishing firms headquartered in an EU country from those that were not. We found 
that this did not impact the level of change in R&D intensity nor did it change any of the findings 
reported in this paper. These models are available from the authors upon request. 
6
 These results are available from the authors upon request.  
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TABLE 1 
PERFORMANCE FEEDBACK CONFIGURATIONS 
 
Performance declined relative 
to the social aspiration level 
Performance increased relative 
to the social aspiration level 
Performance declined relative to 
the historical aspiration level 
(1) Consistently negative 
performance feedback 
 
H1A and H1B: Increase in 
R&D investment 
(2) Inconsistent performance 
feedback 
 
H1A: Increase in R&D 
investment 
H1B: Decrease in R&D 
investment 
Performance increased relative 
to the historical aspiration level 
(3) Inconsistent performance 
feedback 
 
H1A: Decrease in R&D 
investment 
H1B: Increase in R&D 
investment 
(4) Consistently positive 
performance feedback 
 
H1A and H1B: Decrease in 
R&D investment 
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TABLE 2 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
a 
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 
1. Number of employees 2009 (log) 9.31 1.51 
   2. Historical performance discrepancy (/100) -.03 .05 .07**
  3. Social performance discrepancy (/100) -.02 .05 .06* .41***
 4. R&D intensity change .33 1.35 .04 -.20*** -.14***
a
 N=1750 
* p < .05 
** p < .01  
*** p < .001  
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TABLE 3 
OLS REGRESSIONS OF R&D INTENSITY CHANGE
a 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant -5.15 (5.30) -6.17 (4.57) -6.45 (4.64) 
Number of employees 2009 (log) .46 (.49) .50 (.38) .50 (.37) 
Sector dummies Included Included Included 
Region dummies Included Included Included 
Historical performance discrepancy (<0) 
 
-5.11 (4.68) 2.23 (1.57) 
Historical performance discrepancy (>0) 
 
-13.02 (8.12) 15.00 (10.89) 
Social performance discrepancy (<0) 
 
-5.99 (5.01) .67 (3.78) 
Social performance discrepancy (>0) 
 
.35 (4.15) 9.61 (5.62) 
Historical (<0) * Social (<0) 
  
41.65** (14.43) 
Historical (<0) * Social (>0) 
  
-8.47 (16.79) 
Historical (>0) * Social (<0) 
  
129.95* (57.91) 
Historical (>0) * Social (>0) 
  
-48.58 (26.17) 
    
R² .02 .07 .17 
N 1750 1750 1750 
a
 Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
* 
p < .05 
**
 p < .01 
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TABLE 4 
OLS REGRESSIONS OF R&D INTENSITY CHANGE – CONTINUEDa 
 
Model 4 
Constant -6.70 (5.20) 
Number of employees 2009 (log) .55 (.47) 
Sector dummies Included 
Region dummies Included 
Historical performance discrepancy -7.38* (3.55) 
Social performance discrepancy -3.60 (4.65) 
  
R² .07 
N 1750 
 
a
 Clustered standard errors in parentheses  
* 
p < .05 
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FIGURE 1 
R&D INTENSITY CHANGE AS A FUNCTION OF PERFORMANCE-ASPIRATION 
DISCREPANCIES 
  
